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Abstract—Despite the growing threat posed by Android mal-
ware, the research community is still lacking a comprehensive
view of common behaviors and trends exposed by malware fam-
ilies active on the platform. Without such view, the researchers
incur the risk of developing systems that only detect outdated
threats, missing the most recent ones. In this paper, we conduct
the largest measurement of Android malware behavior to date,
analyzing over 1.2 million malware samples that belong to 1.2K
families over a period of eight years (from 2010 to 2017). We
aim at understanding how the behavior of Android malware
has evolved over time, focusing on repackaging malware. In
this type of threats different innocuous apps are piggybacked
with a malicious payload (rider), allowing inexpensive malware
manufacturing.
One of the main challenges posed when studying repackaged
malware is slicing the app to split benign components apart from
the malicious ones. To address this problem, we use differential
analysis to isolate software components that are irrelevant to the
campaign and study the behavior of malicious riders alone. Our
analysis framework relies on collective repositories and recent
advances on the systematization of intelligence extracted from
multiple anti-virus vendors. We find that since its infancy in
2010, the Android malware ecosystem has changed significantly,
both in the type of malicious activity performed by the malicious
samples and in the level of obfuscation used by malware to avoid
detection. We then show that our framework can aid analysts
who attempt to study unknown malware families. Finally, we
discuss what our findings mean for Android malware detection
research, highlighting areas that need further attention by the
research community.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Android app ecosystem has grown considerably over
the recent years, with over 3 million Android apps currently
available at the Google Play official market [6] and with an
average of 28,180 uploads per day to alternative markets such
as Aptoide [7]. The number of unwanted apps has continued
to increase at a similar pace. While it is unclear how many
unwanted samples have hit Google Play, alarming detection
rates have been reported in other markets. For instance, in early
2016 Aptoide took down up to 85% of the samples (742,638)
that were uploaded in just one month after these were deemed
harmful to the users. More recently, researches have discovered
the largest malware campaign found on Google Play with over
36 million infected devices [10].
The increase in the number of malicious apps has come
hand in hand with the proliferation of collective repositories
sharing the latest specimens together with intelligence about
them. VirusTotal [45] and Koodous [23] are two online services
available to the community that allow security operators to
upload samples and scan them for threat assessment. While
there are extensive sets of malware available, most past re-
search work focused their efforts on outdated datasets. One of
the most popular datasets used in the literature is the Android
MalGenome project [54] and the version extended by authors
in [8], named Drebin dataset. While very useful as a reference
point, these datasets span a period of time between 2010 and
2012, and might therefore not be representative of current
threats. Other efforts include More recent approaches are start-
ing to incorporate “modern malware” to their evaluation [29],
[4], [30] with little understanding of (i) the harm those samples
can pose to users or (ii) how prominent those threats are in
practice. Understanding these two factors in perspective plays
a key role for automated approaches that rely on machine-
learning to model the notion of harm—if such systems are
trained on datasets that are outdated or not representative of
the current malware threats, the resulting detection systems
will be ineffective in protecting users.
Despite the need for a better understanding of current
Android malware behavior, previous work is limited. The first
and almost only seminal work putting Android malware in
perspective is dated back to 2012, by Zhou and Jiang [54]. In
their work, the authors dissected and manually vetted 1,200
malware samples categorizing them into 49 families. Most of
the malware reported (about 90%) was so-called repackaging,
which is malware that piggybacks the malicious payload into
various legitimate applications. The remaining 10% accounts
for standalone pieces of malicious software. In the literature,
the legitimate portion of code is referred to as carrier and the
malicious payload is known as rider [52]. In a recent paper
published in 2017 [27], authors presented a study showing how
riders are inserted into carriers. The scope of their work span
from 2011 to 2014 and cover 950 pairs of apps.
In this work, we aim at providing a comprehensive view of
the evolution of Android malware and its current behavior. To
this end, we analyze over 1.28 million malicious samples be-
longing to 1.2K families collected from 2010 to 2017. Unlike
previous studies [54], the vast number of samples scrutinized in
this work causes human analysis to be prohibitive. Therefore,
we develop tools that allow us to automatically analyze our
dataset. A particularly important challenge is identifying the
rider part of an Android malware sample. Our intuition is that
miscreants aggressively repackage many benign applications
with the same malicious payload. Our analysis framework
2works in two steps. First, it relies on recent advances on the
systematization of informative labels obtained from multiple
Anti-Virus (AV) vendors [38], [21], to infer the family of
a sample. Second, it uses differential analysis to remove
code segments that are irrelevant to the particular malware
family, allowing us to study the behavior of the riders alone.
Differential analysis has successfully been applied to detect
prepackaging in the past [42], [11], however it has not been
used to study the behavior of the riders.
We find that riders changed their behavior considerably over
time. While in 2010 it was very common to have malware
monetized by sending premium rate text messages, nowadays
only a minority of malware families exhibit that behavior, and
rather exfiltrate personal information or use other monetization
tricks. We also find that the use of obfuscation techniques
dramatically increased since the early days of Android mal-
ware, with specimens nowadays pervasively using native code
and including external scripts to avoid easy analysis. This
contrasts with the amount of legitimate apps that are currently
obfuscated—a recent investigation shows that less than 25%
of apps in Google Play are obfuscated [47], while we show
that over 90% of the riders have the ability to use advanced
obfuscation techniques. A consequence of this is that anti-
malware systems trained on carriers and/or older datasets
might not be effective in detecting the most recent threats,
especially when they only rely on static analysis.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first up-to-date
systematic study of malicious rider behaviors in the Android
app ecosystem at large. Our contributions are summarized as
follows:
• We propose a system to extract rider behaviors from
repackaged malware. Our system uses differential anal-
ysis on top of annotated control flow graphs extracted
from code fragments of an app.
• We present a systematic study of the evolution of
rider behaviors in the Android malware ecosystem. Our
study measures the prevalence of malicious functionality
across time from a cross-layer perspective.
• We show that our system can be effectively used by an
analyst to study unknown malware families, allowing
her to better understand the operation and the purpose
of riders.
• We analyze the most important findings of our study and
with respect to the most relevant works in the area of
Android malware detection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first describe
the landscape and introduce the framework used to extract
rider behaviors (§II). We then present our study measuring
code from the main Dalvik executable (§III) and from key
accompanying resources (§IV). We illustrate how differential
analysis works in §V and we discuss our findings in §VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A general overview of the measurement methodology is
depicted in Figure 1. For the sample collection we queried
AndroZoo in April 2017 [4], an online repository of samples
from a variety of sources including Google Play, several
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Fig. 1: Measurement methodology: irrelevant components are
removed to study the behavior of riders alone.
unofficial markets, and different torrent sources. AndroZoo
contains over 5.7M samples, and the largest source of apps is
Google Play (with 73% of the apps), followed by Anzhi (with
13%). Out of all apps in the dataset, a large portion of samples
have been reported as malicious by different independent AV
vendors (over 25%). Interestingly, AndroZoo has reported
peaks of about 22% infection rates in the Google Play [4],
constituting the absolute largest source of malware. In our
current snapshot of the AndroZoo dataset, about 14% of the
apps from Google Play have been flagged as malware by at
least one AV vendor.
The information about the AV vendors is offered by Virus-
Total, a subsidiary of Google that runs multiple AV engines
and offers an unbiased access to resulting reports [45]. AV
detection engines are limited, and they certainly do not account
for all the malware existing in the wild. This is known as
zero-day malware. The study of this type of malware is out of
the scope of this measurement. However, we emphasize that
both AndroZoo and VirusTotal keep track of the date where a
sample was first seen and this is leveraged to understand the
time when the malware was operating. Note as well that as
time progresses the amount of zero-day malware is expected
to be lower for the earlier periods of our eight-year long study.
For the label collection we relied on AV labels from 63
different vendors provided by VirusTotal. A common problem
in malware labeling is that different AV vendors use different
denominations for the same family [38]. To solve this problem,
we unified these labels using Euphony [21], an open-source
tool that uses fine-grained labeling to report family names for
Android. Euphony clusters malware based on the AV reports
obtained from VirusTotal, inferring their family names with
high accuracy—with an F-measure performance of 95.5%. It
is important to note that no a-priori knowledge on malware
families is needed.
Figure 2 shows the number of families observed across
time. The stacked plot distinguishes between newly observed
and previously seen families at every quarter of a year. Seen
families account for the set of families where one specimen (of
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Fig. 2: Num. of samples and families seen per quarter.
that family) was seen in VirusTotal prior to the referred date.
After unifying labels and processing all samples as described
in Section II-B, we account for over 1.2 million apps and 1.2K
families. The graph depicts the overall number of samples per
quarter used in this measurement.
A. Landscape
Our first experiment aims at understanding how families
evolve over time from a structural viewpoint. For that, we study
the top families according to the following four definitions:
• Largest Families: top(|Fi|). We take a look at the
top families ordered by the number of samples in each
family (|Fi|), where |Fi| < |Fi−1|∀i = {1, . . . , n}. Note
that this metric only takes in account the number of
samples observed in a family, and not the total number
of installations.
• Prevalent Families: top(|Qji |). Top prevalent families
are ordered by the number of quarters (of a year) where
a sample of a family has been seen; where Qji denotes
quarter j in which a sample of a family i was seen. This
metric aims to identify the most long-lasting malware
families.
• Viral Families: top(|Fi|/|Q
j
i |), where we look at the
ratio between how large a family is and the number of
quarters in which the family was present. This metric
aims at identifying malware families that are both large
and also last for a long period of time.
• Stealthy Families: top(Di), where Di denotes the av-
erage time delta Tvt − Tdex between the moment when
the sample of a family i was compiled (Tdex) and the
first time the sample was seen in VirusTotal (Tvt). This
metric looks at how difficult it is for malware detectors
to identify the samples in a family as malicious.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of apps in top families for
each of the categories described above. The graph depicts the
probability density of the data at different values together with
the standard elements of a boxplot (whiskers representing the
maximum and minimum values, and the segments inside the
boxes the average and the median). To cover a wider range
of cases, only unique families are shown across all four plots.
Although some families are not listed in the graphs, it is worth
noting that AIRPUSH appears within the top 10 in all four
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Fig. 3: Distribution of samples over time for the top families
in each category. The overall number of samples per family
range from 29K to 262K for the largest families (a), from 143
to 11K for the prevalent ones (b), from 2K to 23K for the
virals (c), and from 174 to 18K for stealthy families (d).
categories, LEADBOLT appears in all categories except for the
viral one, and other families such as JIAGU, REVMOB, YOUMI,
and KUGUO appear in both largest and viral categories.
As observed in the timeline given at Figure 3, some families
show multiple distributions indicating that there are outbreaks
at different time periods. This is presumably when malware
authors created a new variant of a family. The similar align-
ment for the second outbreak in some of the families might
be explained by the latency with which AV vendors submit
samples to VirusTotal. Also, it has been reported [17], [49] that
at times miscreants use VirusTotal before distributing samples
to test whether their specimens are detected by AVs or not.
In either case, this is still a good indicator of how malicious
behaviors span over time and one can observe that 2014 and
2016 reported the largest activity.
Special emphasis should be given to SAFEKIDZONE and
PIRATES. The former appears as a top prevalent family and
the distribution of samples across time is remarkably uniform.
This means that the malware creator has been persistently
manufacturing new specimens across four years almost as
if the process was automated. The latter starts the outbreak
aggressively in mid 2013—unlike most of the other families
where infections start progressively.
B. Differential Analysis
In this paper, we aim at establishing a systematic way
of extracting rider methods. For that, we mine methods that
are common to members of the same family. Our underlying
4assumption is that samples belonging to the same family have
the same purpose and are written by the same authors, and
therefore there will be code in common with all the malware
samples in the family. In the simplest case, this common code
will be present in all samples in the family. In other cases,
for example when a malware family is composed of several
subfamilies, it will be manifested in a subset of the samples.
Those methods that are not common to members of the same
family are deemed irrelevant to characterizing the behavior of
the app and discarded.
To identify which methods are common among samples
of the same family, we build on top of a system called
Dendroid [42]. Dendroid uses text mining to analyze code
structures in Android malware families and runs static analysis
to extract a high-level representation of the Control Flow
Graph (CFG) associated to fragments of an app. In particular,
it uses methods as atomic units of code. A hash (fingerprint)
of the CFG of each fragments is computed. We then compare
the set of common fingerprints for each family. Comparing
fingerprints of smaller units of code to measure the similarity
between two apps is known as fuzzy hashing. Fuzzy hashing
has been shown to be an effective way of modeling repackaged
apps [53]. A similar methodology was also applied to Graph-
ical User Interfaces (GUIs) in [11]. Unlike Dendroid, we are
not interested in fragments that are unique to a family (i.e.,
fully discriminant fragments), but in all the methods that are
common to the samples of a certain malware family.
We extended Dendroid to recursively extract fragments
from all available resources within the app of type DEX
or APK. The reason for this is that malware often hides
its malicious payload in DEX or in APK files hosted as
a resource of the main app. When the app is executed,
the malware then dynamically loads the hidden component.
This is referred in the literature as incognito apps [40]. We
also extended Dendroid to consider the semantics of each
basic block in the CFG. This semantic is extracted from the
parameters of all Dalvik instructions related to invoke-* such
as invoke-virtual. These parameters typically refer to
the invocation of libraries (including those from the Android
framework, namely Application Programming Interface) as we
detail in Section III-A. This allow us to combine fuzzy hashing
with a technique known as feature hashing [19]. Feature
hashing reduces the dimensionality of the data analyzed and,
therefore, the complexity of computing similarities among their
feature sets.
C. Common Methods in our Dataset
The total number of samples in our dataset after unifying AV
labels accounts for almost 1.3 million apps and 3K families.
Prior to running the differential analysis, we process the dataset
to extract all classes and build the CFG of their methods. When
processing these samples we found that approximately 1% of
the apps were malformed or could not be unpacked. Also, due
to the nature of the differential analysis we discard families
with less than 7 samples leaving a total of 1,282,022 malicious
apps and 1,226 families.
Figure 4 shows the number of methods common to all
samples of the 1,226 families. It also displays the number
0
20K
40K
60K
80K
100K
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
10-4
10-2
100
102
Number of Methods (%)
Number of Samples
Family ID:
Fig. 4: Percentage of methods common to all samples in a
family (blue area) together with the number of samples per
family (red area).
of samples per family, which are conspicuously unbalanced.
While most of the families have between 7 to 40 samples,
there is one family with about 260K samples (DOWGIN) and
there are two families with about 100K samples (KUGUO and
AIRPUSH). For the sake of readability the graph only displays
sizes up to 100K, with the largest family ending off the chart.
In general, we can observe that there are few families (with
sizes ranging from 7 to 567 samples) where most methods are
common to all apps in the family. In particular, there are 12
families (282 samples) where 100% of their methods appear
in all samples of the family.
When all the methods seen in a family appear in all of
the samples it means that either the family is standalone
malware (without a carrier) or that all members in the family
are repackaging the same goodware. We refer to the latter
phenomenon as early-stage repackaging. While standalone
families are relevant to our analysis, there is no a priori way to
know the type when only looking at the number of common
methods. For this reason, we avoid running differential analysis
on families where at least 90% of their total methods are
common to all samples of the family. This accounts for 25
families (542 samples), which is 0.04% of the dataset. As for
the remaining 1,201 families we observe that the proportion of
methods in common varies across families regardless of their
size. An exception to this are very large families, where the
number of common methods is lower than the average.
Malware development is a continuous process, and criminals
often improve their code producing variants of the same
malware family. Our framework has the potential to trace the
appearance of such variants. As an illustrative example, we
study the prevalence of methods across some of the top apps
in each of the categories presented in Section II-A. Figure 5
shows the example of five malware families in our dataset.
When looking at ANYDOWN, we observe that there are 285
methods common to 99% of the 17,000 samples in the family.
The functionality embedded into these methods constitute the
essence of the family. Even when the number of methods in
common to all samples of the family is small, there are still
a number of methods common to subsets of samples from
the family. For instance, there are only 10 methods shared by
99% of the samples in LEADBOLT but about 75% the apps
(23,000) share more than 150 methods. This can be explained
by the morphing nature of malware. It is commonplace to
5see malware families evolving as markets block the first set
of apps in the campaign [37]. This ultimately translates into
different variants that are very similar. Interestingly, we can
observe that the boundaries defining variants of a family are
sometimes well established. This is the case of ADMOGO, a
family that altogether has about 20,000 samples. We can see a
variant with 2,683 methods common to 67.65% of the samples,
and we can see another variant with one additional method in
common (i.e., 2,684) shared by only 36.11% of those samples.
D. Choice of a cutoff
To be able to operate, our approach needs a cutoff. This
cutoff determines the fraction of apps within a family that
need to share a method before our method considers it as being
representative of that malware family. Ideally, to capture the
behavior of a family we would look at common methods in all
apps (100% threshold). However, in practice this is not the best
choice because AV vendors can accidentally assign to wrong
labels to a sample [13], [31], [22]. In our experiments we set
this threshold to 90% based on the F-measure performance
reported by Euphony (92.7%~95.5% [21]). We consider this
threshold to be a good value to capture the behavior of families,
while allowing some margin for mislabeled samples.
Intuitively, different cutoffs could be set to identify methods
that are not common to entire families, but are indicative of
specific variants (see §II-C). Due to space constraint, we do
not explore this possibility in this paper, but in §VI we discuss
how this direction could be explored in future work.
III. RIDER BEHAVIORS
We use the techniques described in the previous section to
study and characterize rider behaviors in Android malware
from 2010 to 2017. We first introduce the set of behaviors
that we explore, and then give an overview of the general
state. Finally, we study the evolution of such behaviors over
time.
A. Behaviors
To understand how malware behaves, we analyze rider
methods from all observed malware families. We are primarily
interested in learning whether malware exhibits actions related
to certain attack goals as characterized in [43]. In particular,
we are looking at actions related to:
• Privacy Violations. These actions typically involve
queries to the Android Content Resolver framework, the
use of File Access system, or the access to information
such as the Location of the user, among others.
• Exfiltration. The usage of the network combined to-
gether with all those actions related to privacy violations
can indicate the leakage of personal information.
• Fraud. These actions aim at getting direct profit from
the users or the services they use. For instance, mal-
ware might send premium rate messages via the SMS
Manager or it might abuse advertisement networks by
changing the affiliate ID to redirect revenues.
• Evasion. Hardware serial numbers, versions of firmware
and other OS configurations are often used to fingerprint
sandboxes to evade dynamic analysis.
• Obfuscation. The use of obfuscation and other hiding
techniques is a sought after functionality to evade static
analysis. Android offers the option to dynamically load
code during runtime (e.g., with reflection).
• Exploitation. Certain apps implement technical exploits
and attempt to gain root access after being installed.
Most of these exploits are implemented in native code
and triggered using bash scripts that are packed together
with the app in the resources directory.
To measure these behaviors we look at invocations to the
Application Programming Interface (API) used to access key
features of the Android OS or data within the device. APIs are
especially relevant in current smartphones as they incorporate
a number of mechanisms to confine and limit malware activity.
These mechanisms make apps dependent on the Android
framework and all sensitive calls are delivered through a
well-established program interface. Furthermore, API calls are
useful for explaining the behavior of an app and reporting its
capabilities.
Android APIs are organized as a collection of pack-
ages and sub-packages grouping related libraries together.
On the top of the package structure we can find, for in-
stance, libraries from the android.*, dalvik.*, and
java.* packages. On the next level, we can find sub-
packages such as android.os.*, dalvik.system.*, or
java.lang.reflect.*, among others. As most of the
sub-packages belong to the android.* package, for the sake
of simplicity, in this paper we refer to them starting from
the second level. For instance, android.provider.*,
which is a standard interface to data in the device, is
referred as the PROVIDER category. For other packages
(e.g.: dalvik.system.*), we use the full name (i.e.,
DALVIK SYSTEM) with an underscore.
While program analysis can tell what are the set of API
calls that appear in an executable, it is hard to understand
what these calls are used for. However, there are some APIs
that are typically used by riders for certain purposes. This is
the case of APIs that load dynamic code, use reflection or
use of cryptography. These are specially relevant to malware
detection as they enable the execution of dynamic code [34]
and allow the deobfuscation of encrypted code [3]:
i) JAVA NATIVE: This API category captures
libraries that are used to bridge the Java runtime
environment with the Android native environment.
The most relevant API in this category is
java.lang.System.loadLibrary(), which
can load ELF executables prior to their interaction
through the Java Native Interface (JNI).
ii) DALVIK SYSTEM: This category allow the execution
of code that is not installed as part of an app. The
following API call is key for the execution of incog-
nito Dalvik executables: dalvik.system.Class-
Loader.DexClassLoader().
iii) JAVA EXEC: This API category allow apps to inter-
face with the environment in which they are run-
6Fig. 5: Prevalence of methods across apps for top most popular families per category (revmob & leadbot for large families, gpspy
& fakeflash for prevalent families, admago & anydown for viral families, and malformed & lockad for stealthy families).
ning. The most relevant API in this category is
java.lang.Runtime.exec(), which executes the
command specified as a parameter in a separate process.
This can be used to run text executables.
iv) JAVA REFLECTION: This category contains a number
of APIs that make possible the inspection of classes
and methods at runtime without knowing them at com-
pilation time. This can be very effective to hider static
analysis (e.g., by hiding APIs).
v) JAVAX CRYPTO: These APIs provide a number of
cryptographic operations that can be used to obfuscate
and de-obfuscate payloads.
It is important to highlight that the categories described
above are not comprehensive and the same set of APIs can
be used for different purposes. For instance, accessing the
contacts (via the PROVIDER) can be used both for leaking
personal information or for evasion1.
B. Overview
Overall, for the 1.2 million apps in our dataset we observe
a total of 155.7 million methods, out of which about 1.3
million are rider methods. The average number of methods
per app is 121 and the largest number of different methods
in one single family reaches 16.5 millions. Overall, each
family has on average 1,225 raider methods. We deep inspect
those methods to query the set of behaviors discussed in the
previous section. Table I summarizes the most relevant groups
of behaviors found and their prevalence in the studied families.
As expected, families persistently query the OS framework
1Out-of-the-box sandboxes generally have no contacts, which can be
leveraged for fingerprinting these sandboxes.
(i.e., the ANDROID category) to access phone resources.
The most prevalent functions from the Android framework
are android.app.* (APP category), and android.os.*
(OS category). These packages provide support for inter-
process communication and basic operating system services
(e.g., AsyncTask, Activities and Services). Another category
widely used is CONTENT, which gives access to certain private
information. This is used in over 70% of the riders seen and
over 80% of the families. Other private information such as
the location (LOCATION category) is observed in 21% of the
families. This accounts for about 4% of the samples in the
entire dataset. The use of the network (NET category) is seen
in 46% of the families. When looking at the total number of
samples that use the network we observe that reaches to 12%
of the families. Access to the content providers together with
the use of the network, can indicate the exfiltration of personal
information.
There are four different groups of interfaces that can be
used to dynamically load code at runtime, DALVIK SYSTEM
JAVA REFLECTION, JAVA NATIVE and JAVA EXEC. When
looking at the use of dynamic Dalvik code, we find that
the DALVIK SYSTEM category is only used in 7% of the
families and 1% of the samples. This means that overall very
few families have the capability of dynamically manipulat-
ing Dalvik code at runtime. When looking at the dynamic
manipulation of Java code, (JAVA REFLECTION category)
we observe that 42% of the families and 11% of the to-
tal samples show evidences of this behavior. This indicates
that Java-based obfuscation is not a stock feature used by
all malware developers, yet it is persistently found in our
dataset. One of the most popular API calls in this category
is Java.lang.Class.getClassLoader(), which ac-
7TABLE I: Percentage of families (and samples) where their
members share a feature in common with at least 90% of
the apps in each family. Note that some APIs names such
as Telephony (i.e., TelephonyManager) have been shortened.
FEATURE #Fam (#Apps)
ANDROID 98.8% (99.4%)
APP 96.5% (96.2%)
CONTENT 83.9% (73.4%)
OS 77.9% (52.4%)
WIDGET 66.8% (39.7%)
VIEW 62.1% (31.0%)
UTIL 56.2% (21.6%)
DATABASE 46.8% (12.8%)
WEBKIT 46.4% (30.7%)
NET 46.2% (12.0%)
GRAPHICS 46.0% (24.8%)
JAVA REFLECTION 42.3% (10.5%)
TEXT 40.3% (9.3%)
SUPPORT 33.8% (7.7%)
ANIMATION 26.6% (6.2%)
TELEPHONY 26.0% (5.6%)
MEDIA 25.4% (6.2%)
PROVIDER 22.4% (5.1%)
FEATURE #Fam (#Apps)
LOCATION 20.7% (3.7%)
JAVAX CRYPTO 18.1% (6.0%)
HARDWARE 17.3% (2.1%)
JAVA NATIVE 15.5% (17.7%)
PREFERENCE 9.7% (1.1%)
ACCOUNTS 9.2% (1.2%)
JAVA EXEC 9.1% (1.0%)
DALVIK SYSTEM 7.4% (1.0%)
DEBUG 5.9% (0.8%)
SPEECH 5.3% (1.6%)
BLUETOOTH 2.5% (0.4%)
SMS 1.8% (0.1%)
SMSMESSAGE 1.7% (0.1%)
RENDERSCRIPT 1.5% (0.0%)
GESTURE 0.6% (0.0%)
SECURITY 0.8% (0.2%)
SERVICE 0.4% (0.0%)
NFC 0.3% (0.0%)
counts for the 38% of the families and 41% of the samples.
The use of cryptographic APIs is frequently seen together
with the use of reflection. While reflection alone can hinder
automated processes that rely on static analysis, encrypting the
class and method names that are passed to the reflection APIs
can challenge manual reverse engineering too. In this case,
we observe that 18% of the families use JAVAX CRYPTO, but
only 6% of the samples. It is interesting to see that while the
proportion of families is similar for both JAVA REFLECTION
and JAVAX CRYPTO, the total number of samples in the
former is about 0.6 millions (51%) and in the latter is only
360 thousand. This can indicate that consolidated families (i.e.,
very large ones) do not use JAVAX CRYPTO, while smaller
but more recent do. We provide evidence of this in §III-C.
It is worth noting that cryptographic functions can be used
by ransomware to encrypt user files as well. We also provide
evidence of this in §V-A.
When looking at other forms of dynamic execution, we see
a drop in popularity. In particular, we can observe that the use
of native code (JAVA NATIVE category) drops to 15% of the
families. Despite this drop, the total number of samples using
native executables is much larger than those using reflection
(with about 18% of the dataset and roughly 200K pieces of
malware). As for the use of JAVA EXEC, we see a drop in both
the number of families and the number of samples with respect
to the other types of dynamic execution. This evidences the
morphing nature of families and suggests that certain variants
of a family might become more sophisticated over time.
The use of the TELEPHONY category accounts for 26% of
the families and 74% of the samples. The use of this category
is usually indicative of evasion, but it could also be used
to exfiltrate certain serial numbers from the device to track
the user. Other hardware components such as the sensors or
those from the GESTURE category can also be used for these
purposes. In this case, however, their prevalence indicates that
families are not currently relying on them. For instance, the
use of GESTURE only accounts for 0.6% of the families.
Our results also indicate that premium-rate frauds, which fall
into the SMS category, are not used at large with only 2%
of the families. This type of fraud was thought to be very
prevalent, accounting for about 18% of families (30 out of
171) in Drebin [39]. While the number of families exhibiting
the SMS category is remarkably small, it is worth noting that
scrutinized samples span through a drifting eight-year period.
We next show how these, and other behaviors, have evolved
over time.
C. Evolution over Time
Malware is a moving target and behaviors drift over time
as miscreants modify their goals and attempt to avoid de-
tection. In this section we measure how behaviors evolved
across several years. According at the type of API call, we
group behaviors into three categories: (i) sensitive APIs, (ii)
network communication, and (iii) obfuscation. Figure 6 shows
behaviors associated to families by quarter of a year for each of
the categories. The graphs represent the proportion of families
that exhibit a certain capability in a given quarter, showing
how families evolve over time. It is possible to observe that,
as discussed in II-A, the distribution of malware samples per
quarter is not uniform, but there are two spikes in our data,
one in Q1 2014 and one in Q4 2015 (399 and 819 families
acting in those quarters, respectively). On average, the number
of families observed per quarter is 280. Regardless of the
presence of these two spikes, when looking at how behaviors
evolve overall, one can typically observe a trend based on how
prevalent API calls are across time. To study this, we plot
the best fit to each set of API calls using linear regression.
Note that the cutoff here is applied to the samples of a family
that were observed during that quarter (see Figure 2 for a
snapshot of the number of samples and families seen per
quarter). As samples in a family are scattered throughout time,
this timeline gives an understanding of how the family evolves,
which naturally fits with the notion of variant discussed in §II.
Sensitive APIs: Figure 6a shows behaviors related to generic
actions such as File System (FS) actions or OS-related APIs.
FS- and OS-related behaviors are typically found in families
that attempt to execute an exploit [1] These behaviors include
the use of API calls such as Process.killProcess()
or Process.myPid(). Also, IO operations such as
File.mkdir() are used in preparation to the exploitation.
Most of these behaviors have increased sharply over the last
few years all the way to 75% for Process.myPid() or
80% for File.mkdir().
Network Communication: Figure 6b shows behaviors re-
lated to network communications in general. One of the first
takeaways that can be obtained is related to the negative trend
in the use of the SmsManager.sendTextMessage()
API. This API call is usually associated to a common fraud that
profits from silently sending premium rate messages. As shown
in the timeline, this type of malware was popular between the
end of 2012 and 2014. One factor behind the popularity of
this fraud was its simplicity (it typically does not require the
support of a back-end). However, starting from mid 2014 this
behavior sees a drop in popularity—from about 40% to 10%
of the families. Interestingly, we observe that the overall use
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(c) Prevalence of obfuscation.
Fig. 6: Percentage of families active in each quarter of a year where at least 90% of their members share a feature in common.
of the SMS category in Table I is lower than in any point of
the time line. Recall that Figure 6 represents samples active
only in a given period, which is closely related to the presence
of behaviors from variants of a family operating in a given
time. Instead, Table I presents a macro-perspective overview,
which shows the prevalence of behaviors attributed to the
backbone of the family. Thus, the level of granularity shown
when measuring rider behaviors in a time-line manner is much
more precise than when looking at a macro perspective.
We can also observe that the use of the
HttpURLConnection.connect() API call has
increased over the last years. This API call when combined
together with those related to privacy violations (e.g.,
ContentResolver.query()) is commonly used to
exfiltrate personal information [15]. This information is
most likely sold on underground markets or used as part
of a larger operation [32] (see Section V for a case
study discussing exfiltration of personal information).
HttpURLConnection.connect() can also be used to
retrieve new payloads, which is known as update attacks. The
use of more sophisticated attacks such as those requiring the
support of a Command & Control (C&C) structure indicate a
change in the way miscreants monetize their creations from
the initial premium-rate fraud [43]. This can be attributed in
part to the proliferation of inexpensive bulletproof servers
or robust botnet structures that allow campaigns to last
longer [5], [20].
We also observe behaviors could be aimed at evading
dynamic analysis. As mentioned earlier, malware often queries
certain hardware attributes (or sensor values) that are usu-
ally set to default in sandboxes. This is the case of the
values given by Connectivity.getActiveNetwork()
or Wifi.getConnectionInfo() API calls. Although the
latter is not shown in the figure, both increase with a similar
trend reaching 70% and 55% of the families by 2017 respec-
tively.
Obfuscation: The use of reflection has increased over the
last years from slightly over 20% of the families in 2012 to
about 50-60% in 2016 and 2017 as shown in Figure 6c. The
use of this feature can be mainly attributed to obfuscation.
Other forms of obfuscation can be evidenced by looking at the
evolution of the crypt category, which is one the most prevalent
ones. The number of families using cryptographic APIs started
at 100% in 2011 and dropped to 60% in the following year.
Soon after that, we observe a uniform increase reaching 90%
in 2017. This most likely means that back in 2011 miscreants
that started manufacturing malware for Android had a high
technical expertise. As Android became the platform of choice,
more actors with different expertise were involved and the use
of crypt dropped the next years, to become a common feature a
few years thereafter, perhaps out of necessity to evade malware
detection systems. Another form of loading Java code during
runtime is via the ClassLoader.DexClassLoader()
API call. Results show that the usage of this interface increases
over the years to 70% in 2017. To trace the use of incognito
apps, we recursively looked at all APK and DEX resources in
the app and analyzed their methods. Common methods orig-
inating from incognito apps are, however, not prevalent. This
means that hiding code relevant to the family via incognito
apps is either not popular or not evident—note that advanced
hiding techniques can be effectively used to evade automated
systems [41].
Interestingly, we can observe that the use of
System.loadLibrary(), which is related to the
invocation of native libraries, has increased sharply over
the years from 25% in 2011 to 80% in 2017. With a more
modest trend we observe that Runtime.exec() is still very
prevalent nowadays. These two APIs are the main entry point
for dynamically loading non-Java code that is not installed
as part of the application. The most common executables
loaded are ELF executables and text executables respectively.
As behaviors offloaded to these components can not be seen
from Dalvik, we deep inspect the resources of each app and
report these findings in §IV.
Recent work studied the use of obfuscation on goodware
on the Google Play store [47] Authors showed that less than
25% of apps have been obfuscated by the primary developer.
Instead, we show that the obfuscation in malware is way
more prominent. This might explain why the proliferation
of malware have been so acute over the recent years—while
miscreants can easily process un-obfuscated carriers to build
new versions of their malware, security experts are, more than
ever before, confronted with obfuscated riders. The increas-
ingly prevalent use of reflection, of native libraries, and scripts
9indicates that the behaviors that we observe by performing
static analysis might not constitute the full set of actions
performed by malware when executed—we refer the reader
to §VI for a discussion on the limitations of our work. This
also means that recent ML-based works in the area of malware
detection that do not take into account obfuscation are most
likely modeling the behaviors seen in the carriers rather than
those belonging to the riders. Thus, we argue that there is a
strong need for a change of paradigm in the malware detection
realm. We argue that the community should focus efforts on
building novel detection techniques capable of dealing with
obfuscation.
IV. RESOURCES
Malware authors often offload payloads from the Dalvik
executable to make the application look benign to cursory
inspection [34], [3]. Previously, we showed that the use of
incognito apps2 is not very prevalent. In this section, we
analyze other type of executables that are often packed together
into the APK and they are generally overlooked by current
Android malware detection systems [40], [48].
A. Resource Extraction
We look at the header of all resources in an app and analyze
the magic number that is used to identify the file format.
We select those files that are strongly typed and we further
analyze those that are executables. In particular, we look at text
executables such as bash scripts used to run shell commands,
and at ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) executables used
to load native libraries. From all files selected, we computed
their hash and studied the prevalence of common resources
across apps in the family by looking at exact hash matches.
We then use a cutoff of 30% to study their prevalence in a
family. We choose this threshold because higher thresholds
reported a low number of common resources, possibly because
of the pervasive use of obfuscation (as we will see). Out of all
families in our dataset, we only found about 44 with common
text or ELF executables. As we saw in the previous section,
malware’s use of cryptography is increasing over time, and this
might explain the small number of unobfuscated librararies and
scripts observed in our dataset.
B. Text Executables
Text executables (such as shell scripts) constitute an easy
way of reusing existing malicious code—they facilitate porting
payloads across different platforms and are used to bridge Java-
land components and executables compiled in native code.
They also enable attackers to access a suite of admin- or
system-related commands such as mount to re-mount, for
instance, partitions with higher privileges (typically to add
writing permission into the system image and install root tools
or other useful utilities3). We refer the reader to Appendix A
2Other Dalvik executables and APKs embedded into the main app (see
Section II-B).
3Such as the busybox toolbox.
TABLE II: Excerpt of native libraries found in our dataset.
• busybox • goDEX • libobserver.so
• firewall • hcitool • stagefrightCheck
• dexop • gdbserver • panda super shell
• reboot • crashCheck • cloud service
for an illustrative example of the type of text executables
embedded within the resources of an app.
In our study, we parse every text executable that is in
common to the sample of malware families using the threshold
introduced earlier. We extract a set of features for each file,
i.e.: we look at the frequency of bash commands (and other
relevant keywords) observed in different payloads in the wild.
Table IV (also in Appendix A) summarizes some of these
features. Overall, we observe behaviors related the following
features: rm, grep, mkdir, /system/bin/sh, start, and /data/data.
These behaviors have been observed in only four families.
One can immediately observe that the number of families with
common scripts in plain-text is negligible. However, in §III-B
we showed that about 9% of the families exhibit the use
of JAVA EXEC (associated to the execution of scripts) as
shown in Table I. While a significant number of families can
potentially execute scripts, a larger number (about 20%) also
shows the use of cryptographic behaviors. In our analysis, we
can only account for resources that are both in plain text and
have not been modified (using for instance polymorphism).
This small number could also be attributed to the proliferation
of update attacks, where the payload is offloaded from the
APK. We refer the reader to Section VI for a discussion on
the limitations of our approach.
During our experiments we observed that the use of scripts is
more prevalent in certain variants than in entire families. This
indicates that most likely variants in families have adopted the
use of obfuscation or any other form of code mangling later
in their lifecycle and resources in some earlier variants remain
un-obfuscated.
C. ELF Executables
Android uses ELF shared object libraries for both the Java
Native Interface and for Android Runtime (ART) applications.
These type of libraries are typically developed in C/C++ and
provide developers with efficient mechanisms to directly access
certain hardware modules. Many malware families rely on
these executables because they can be easily be ported from
other Unix systems. This way, miscreants have access to a
large portfolio of tools than can run in Android devices with
minimal effort. Table II shows the name of some libraries
found in our dataset. One can find utility libraries aiming
at escalating privileges such as the panda_super_shell,
or the stagefrightCheck, and crashCheck libraries.
Stagefright is a group of Android bugs that attempts to crash
the system by sending crafted images or videos to the medi-
aserver—the sub-system responsible for processing media file
in Android. Also, goDEX and dexop are known libraries that
can inspect other DEX files, which can be used to manipulate
incognito apps or to exploit vulnerable apps installed in the
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device. It is also possible to find other libraries that can be
used to configure Bluetooth connections such as hcitool.
These examples give an idea of the type of executables that
are typically embedded in malware.
ELF executables in Android use the Bionic C library4 and
a dynamic linker that loads shared libraries at runtime. In
our work we study well-defined library dependencies that are
declared at compilation time and are needed to load linked
functions to the Bionic libraries (libc, libdl, libpthread, etc)
during runtime. These functions are used to invoke critical
system calls such as ioctl, which is used for Android’s
inter-procedural and inter-component communication (ICC).
In particular, we look at the sh_link linking section in
the file header and extract the ancillary information needed
to understand which shared libraries are loaded and to which
functions are linked to.
Table V (cf. Appendix B) shows the prevalence of studied
functions. Similar to the case of of text executables, the number
of families with common ELFs is small. This is again expected
as these type of resources are also commonly obfuscated [3].
The most popular behaviors are abort(), memcpy(), open() or
kill(). These behaviors are associated to operations invoked
when trying to gain privilege escalation via exploitation. Other
functions observed associated to the use of vulnerability ex-
ploitation techniques are: malloc()5, fork(), getpid(), chmod(),
or chown(). Note that modifying both the ownership (chown)
and the permissions (chmod) of files is also done from text
scripts as shown in Figure 8. On another note, we can observe
the use of getopt() and getopt long(). This function parses the
command-line arguments, which might indicate that some of
these ELFs are invoked from bash scripts.
Surprisingly, the use of ioctl() is not very prevalent. This
shows that common ELF libraries are typically not used for
accessing information through the Android ICC Binder pro-
tocol (e.g., personal information such as the location or other
information stored in content providers such as the contacts).
It is also possible to observe the use of network activity as
shown with socket(), inet addr, gethostbyname, getnetbyaddr,
and getnetbyname. One can further observe the use of certain
functions from libraries such as libiptc to interact with the
module in charge of firewalling and packet filtering the device
(see for instance, iptc append entry, xtables chain protos, or
iptables globals, among other related functions not listed in
the table).
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section we present three case studies to illustrate how
differential analysis can be used to analyze and understand
rider behaviors. In particular, we have selected (i) a case study
from a sophisticated long-lasting ransomware campaign, (ii)
two shady advertisement libraries that have infected over 11K
apps, and (iii) a recent but viral malware family that has
been operating in 2017. These case studies show that our
methodology is effective in identifying the important methods
4 The standard C library developed by Google for Android.
5As well as calloc(), and realloc().
TABLE III: Summary of behaviors observed in the case studies
analyzed in this paper.
Family CONTENT IO REFLECTION TELEPHONY DATABASE
SIMPLOCKER    
UTCHI     
LOCKAD     
HIDDENAP   
that better characterize a malware family, and help analysts
understand its functionalities.
A. Ransomware: The case of SIMPLOCKER
We first study the case of SIMPLOCKER, a ransomware
that has been operating since 2014Q3 and mainly targeted
Google Play. While there are several ransomware families in
our dataset such as JISUT, SLOCKER, GEPEW, or SVPENG to
name a few, SIMPLOCKER is one of the first confirmed file-
encrypting malware families targeting Android [18]. The way
Android ransomware operated prior to this family made file
recovery possible without paying the ransom. In particular,
these early versions attempted to keep user information hostage
by simply locking their devices but without encrypting the
file system. Technical experts could then bypass the locking
mechanism using standard forensic tools (e.g., mounting the
file system from a PC).
Our dataset accounts for 30 specimens of SIMPLOCKER with
a total of 35,825 distinct methods. Out of those, 1,166 (3.2%)
methods are common to at least 28 apps. We can also find
295 (0.8%) methods common to all 30 apps. Table III shows a
summary of the behaviors observed. We observe the use of the
file system (IO behaviors), the access to personal information
(via the content provider), and the use of database-related
libraries (DATABASE).
Details about the most relevant methods seen in this family
are listed in Appendix C. When analyzing the common meth-
ods found, we can see that this family uses the DATABASE li-
brary to explore DDBB in method-1057. This library is used to
explore data returned through a content provider, which is used
to access data stored by other apps such as the contacts app. We
can also observe that this type of ransoware uses its own crypto
suit rather than relying on standard Java libraries. In particular,
methods in com.nisakii.encrypt.* such as method-
662, method-909 and method-1082 shown in Figure 9 are used
to encrypt stolen files. Once files are encrypted they are erased
as seen in method-1075, which uses the java.io.File.delete()
API call for this. Method-1075 is part of the FileProvider
class in the Landroid/support/v4/content library).
This library has been developed by Google to provide newer
features on earlier versions of Android.
As mentioned before, our system does not make a priori
assumptions based on the name of the package or its prove-
nance. This is simply because “legitimate libraries” can be used
with a malicious intent6. This is precisely what happens with
method-1075 (Fig. 9)—while the library is built by Google
6Recall that we use the term legitimate libraries to refer to those packages
that are prevalently used in goodware or have been developed by a trusted
party.
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and widely used in goodware, SIMPLOCKER heavily relies on
it for malicious purposes.
B. Adware: The case of UTCHI and LOCKAD
We next present the case of two adware families named
UTCHI and LOCKAD. This form of fraud typically monetize
personal information to deliver targeted advertisement cam-
paigns. While the campaign delivered by the former family
has been operating for over three years and it is one of the
most viral families, the latter is characterized by its novelty and
stealthiness, and displays a clear distinction in the complexity
of the malware evolution.
UTCHI is a family named after a shady advertisement library
that leaks the user’s personal information after being embedded
into infected apps. The library has been piggybacked into
over 13K apps distributed throughout different markets such as
AppChina, Anzhi, or Google Play. This family is one of the top
virals shown in Section II-A and it mostly operated between
the end of 2015 and early 2016, although the campaign had
been running for almost three years since the end of 2013 until
mid 2016. From all samples processed, we observe that there
are 27 methods with sensitive behaviors (cf. Section III-A)
common to more than 12K apps. Table III shows a summary
of the behaviors observed. Among others, these behaviors
include network activity, access to content provider, access
to unique serial numbers (via the telephony manager), and
the use of reflection. Due to lack of space, we present the
details of the most relevant methods seen in this family in
Appendix D. Similar behaviors can be seen in other data-
hungry advertisement networks such as those observed in
LEADBOLT, ADWO, KUGOU, or YOUMI.
Similarly, LOCKAD piggybacks some libraries that are
used to exfiltrate personal information from the user to
later display unsolicited advertisements. Some of the
services that are loaded as part of the infected app
are: com.dotc.ime.ad.service.AdService or
mobi.wifi.adlibrary.AdPreloadingService. To
avoid detection and hinder static analysis, samples in this
family obfuscate certain core components of the embedded
library. For instance, the library unpacks configuration
parameters from an encrypted asset-file called ‘cleandata’
as shown in Figure 7 (method-345). These parameters are
later used to decrypt additional content fetched from the
Internet. Method-4670 contains the decryption routine that
uses standard AES decryption in CBC mode and with PKCS5
Padding. The routines displayed in this figure have been
reverse-engineered and method names (e.g., make_md5)
have been renamed to better illustrate the behavior of this
method. Finally, we can also observe in this family methods
that provide support to run Text Executables. When running a
dynamic analysis of one of the samples, we could corroborate
that the APIs seen attempted to invoke several processes (e.g.,
/proc/*/cmdline) to run the executables.
Apart from leaking personal information, both families also
use reflection to dynamically load new functionality.
Method-345: Seen in 6 apps (out of 7)
Class Name: Lrk; Method name: a
Behaviors: {NET}; Routine:
inStream = pContext.getAssets().open("cleandata");
a = new JSONObject(rg.a("hwiHQowgVwx2I", inStream));
Method-4670: Seen in 7 apps (out of 7)
Class Name: Lrg; Method name: a
Behaviors: {CRYPTO}; Routine:
String a(String key, InputStream param){
Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
byte[] md5 = make_md5(key.getBytes("UTF-8"));
c.init(2, new SecretKeySpec(md5, "AES"), IV);
CipherInputStream is = new CipherInputStream(param, c);
[ Calls to CipherInputStream is byte by byte ]}
Fig. 7: Excerpt of common methods for LOCKAD.
C. First Seen 2017Q1: The case of HIDDENAP
We now present the case of a family called HIDDENAP that
was first seen in early 2017 and soon after accounted for 83
samples in our dataset. HIDDENAP is one of the largest families
seen in 20177. Apps in this family are mainly distributed
through alternative markets and all samples in our dataset
have been obtained from one of the largest Chinese alternative
market (i.e., the Anzhi market). This family is fairly basic and
it only has 17 methods common to all apps. These methods
exhibit behaviors mainly related to IO operations together with
other standard actions from the Android framework such as the
content provider (see Table III for a summary).
Once the device is infected, the malware
runs an update attack in a method called
com.secneo.guard.Util.checkUpdate() (method-
17 in Appendix E, Figure 11). It then attempts to
drop additional apps and install them with the support
of some native libraries called libsecexe.so,
libsecpreload.so, and SmartRuler.so that are
embedded into the app. The last two libraries have been
seen together with apps that are packed using a known
service called Bangcle8 [51]. The third library most likely
contain a exploit that would grant root privileges to the
malware. All native libraries are compiled both for x86
and ARM processors. Before loading the library, the
malware first checks which is the right architecture of the
device with Lcom/secneo/guard/Util.checkX86()
(method-7) using standard API call such as File.exists() or
System.getProperty().
Even though this family is using a packer to obfuscate
parts of the code, the hook inserted in the Java part has
meaningful method names that convey very accurately what the
malware does. This indicates that the actor behind this family
is either unexperienced of reckless. Considering that the app
is obfuscated using an online packer, we can conclude that in
this case the miscreant has a limited technical background.
7Together with a family called GGSOT.
8https://www.bangcle.com/ (in Chinese).
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VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, we first discuss a number of limitations of
our study. Despite these limitations, our findings constitute
a good approximation of the Android malware ecosystem.
Thus, we later highlight the most important findings observed
and discuss future trends and their implications for Android
malware research.
A. Limitations
A sensible goal for a malware developer is to obfuscate
or offload the rider to a remote host. We next discuss the
challenges behind analyzing these type of threats together with
the main limitation of differential analysis (i.e., the need for a
precise accounting of the members in a family).
Obfuscation: Our study inherits the limitations of static
analysis and thus can unavoidably miss obfuscated riders. In
fact, we have observed not only that the use of cryptographic
APIs has increased significantly over the years, but we have
also seen that the number of common resources is smaller than
expected. This problem is the scope of our future work as
we explain next. Even when specimens rely on obfuscation,
due to the nature of the Android platform they nonetheless
require a trigger that would deobfuscate the payload. We
can isolate these triggers using differential analysis as done
in this work. This can aid dynamic analysis techniques to
fuzz only those classes (and methods) where the hook to
the obfuscated payload rests. Dynamic behaviors emanating
from those payloads can then be used to extend the set
of behaviors seen statically. Note that standalone dynamic
analysis of repackaged malware also suffers from the problem,
i.e., carrier- and rider-derived behaviors are intertwined. Thus,
our differential analysis framework accordingly combined with
dynamic analysis can overcome this limitation.
The underlying technique that we used to compute dif-
ferential analysis assumes that piggybacked classes respect
the morphology of their code (in terms of CFG). There are
advanced obfuscation techniques such as polymorphic and
metamorphic malware that could alter the structure of the
code (including the CFG of their methods). Furthermore,
recent work shows that it is feasible to use stegomalware
to systematically add dynamic code [41], [50]. This would
render differential analysis useless. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there is no evidence in the wild that would indicate
that this type of obfuscation is used in Android malware at
large.
Update Attacks: In update attacks, the rider is loaded at
runtime [34]. Typically, the payload is stored in a remote host
and retrieved after the app is executed as shown in [3]. Unless
the rider is stored in plain text within the resources of an
app, our study is vulnerable to this attack. We could overcome
this limitation in a similar way as in the case of obfuscated
malware—using dynamic analysis. For local update attacks, we
recursively inspect every resource to find incognito apps. We
append the methods of those apps to the methods of the main
executable before running our differential analysis framework.
Notion of Family: The way in which differential analysis
is used in this paper requires a precise accounting of the
members in a family. To do so, we rely on Euphony [21] which
in turn leverages on threat intelligence shared from multiple
AV vendors. Unifying diversified AV labels is a challenging
process that might be subject to miss-classifications. This is
simply because Euphony is forced to make decisions based
on information given by AVs, whose family definitions might
disagree with each other. Unifying labels is thus prone to error
(especially with very recent malware families). Furthermore,
the morphing nature of malware renders the notion of family
incomplete and makes differential analysis dependent on the
variants.
In our work, we overcome these challenges by introducing a
of cutoff that is flexible can be configured. For the case of API-
based behaviors (§III), we set the threshold to 90% rather than
100% to minimize the impact of potential miss-classifications
in Euphony. The selection of this threshold was motivated
based on the performance reported in [21]. In this setting,
we show during the time-line analysis that grouping samples
chronologically provides a more granular way to understand
how variants of a family behave and, ultimately, how families
evolve. For the case of file-based resources (§IV) we set the
threshold to 30%. This is because families have adopted the
use of obfuscation later in their lifecycle and resources in some
earlier variants remain un-obfuscated.
The cutoff chosen can cover a wide range of variants when
combined with a chronological grouping. In any case, one
could set the chosen thresholds even lower to fine-tune the
granularity of the variants observed. However, this could risk
the inclusion of code fragments coming from the carriers. This
is because different goodware can import the same libraries as
discussed in [25]. Thus, a set of carriers from the same family
could have common legitimate libraries.
One option could be to ‘white-list’ those libraries and re-
move known software components before applying differential
analysis. Along these lines, Google has recently proposed the
use of what they call functional peers to set as ‘normal’
behaviors that are often seen in known goodware of the same
category (peers) [33]. However, in our work we choose not to
do this. The main reason behind this is that legitimate libraries
can also be used with a malicious intent. In fact, the case study
shown in Section V-A describes the case of a ransomware that
uses the android.support.v4.content library with a
malicious intent.
For our purpose, we consider that keeping a threshold
relatively high (i.e., above 90%) is enough to avoid including
code fragments from the carriers. As part of the future work,
we are planning to study where the boundary between variants
and carriers stand and the impact of lower thresholds. Here,
we would further set a lower cutoff to explore behaviors that
could either belong to the carrier or to the rider—namely, gray
cutoff (GCO). Intuitively, thresholds can be seen as how likely
the set of behaviors observed belong to the different parts of
the specimen as described next:
• HCO: We could say with a high degree of confidence
that a common method in this cutoff belongs to the set
of behaviors that characterize the family as a whole.
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• MCO: We could say with a high degree of confidence
that a common method in this cutoff belongs to the set
of behaviors that characterize a variant of this family.
• LCO: We could say with confidence that a common
method in this cutoff belongs to the set of behaviors
that characterize a smaller variant of this family.
• GCO: We could say that a common method in this
cutoff might belong to the set of behaviors that char-
acterize the carrier, but they could also belong to an
outlier variant of this family.
In this work we assume that if a method appears in a
large portion of samples in a family, it can be considered
harmful or it could potentially be used maliciously by most
of the members of a family. As part of our future work,
we are planning to taint all common methods that appear
frequently in top ranked apps in Google Play. We also want
to leverage on existing knowledge about piggybacked pairs
of raiders and carriers to also taint methods that appear to
be common [11], [27]. In this case, common methods would
reveal those software fragments that belong to the carrier as
opposed to what we do in our paper. Tainted methods could
also be used to elaborate on the aforementioned concept of
functional peers to provide stronger guarantees of the software
provenance in repackaged malware. All in all, this information
can help to provide a notion of risk, where behaviors that
appear mostly in riders and are never seen in goodware should
be considered highly risky and vice versa.
B. Key Findings
In this work, we look at software components that can be
attributed to malware alone. In particular, we look at: (i) Dalvik
executables, (ii) text executables, and (iii) ELF executables to
provide a cross-layer inspection. While our study inherits some
limitations as discussed above, we observe a large number
of apps displaying common, and more importantly, sensitive
behaviors. Our findings constitute a large-scale longitudinal
measurement of malice in the Android ecosystem. We next
summarize the key takeaways of our work and discuss their
implications to Android malware research.
Threat evolution: Our results show that certain threats have
evolved rapidly over the last years. For example, premium-rate
frauds that were seen in about 40% of the families in 2013 and
dropped to 10% in late 2016. On the contrary, the use of native
support has increased sharply from 15% in 2011 to 80% in
2017. From all resources explored, we also found that native
behaviors are currently associated to vulnerability exploitation
rather than exfiltration of personal information (i.e., Binder is
barely used in common ELFs).
This only shows the importance of a time-line evaluation
when developing new malware detection approaches, together
with the need for research outcomes reporting results on sam-
ples with features tailored to the type of threat faced in each
period. Recent works in the area [8], [28], [36] neither report
time-lined results, nor use features from native libraries. These
two items should constitute a guideline for future research in
the area of malware detection. More recent works [30] have
investigated the evolution of malware detection over time, but
have not looked at how samples change.
Native code: We show that malware is increasingly using
auxiliary executables, especially in the form of native libraries.
Broadening the spectrum to goodware, recent reports have
shown that the usage of native code accounts for approximately
37% of the apps in Google Play [2]. When accounting only
for executables that are common to samples in a family
or their variants, we observe that these figures are lower.
In particular, we found 44 families with common resources
(3.7% of all families). The total amount of samples in those
families is about 4,7K samples (0.4% of all samples). However,
results show otherwise when looking at the Java native support
(JAVA NATIVE). Here, we can observe the number of families
that have the capability to load native libraries from Java
increases to 45.5%.
As mentioned, the difference between the number of com-
mon ELFs observed and the numbers reported from the
JAVA NATIVE support can be attributed to either the use of
obfuscation or to update attacks. When looking at the native
support, we see an increase of 10% in the usage of native
code than what is reported for malware. We believe that the
large portfolio of native tools available in other platforms will
contribute to the proliferation of malware relying on these type
of payloads. This poses a major threat to current malware
detection systems as they fail to analyze native code [44].
Thus, we position that future research efforts should focus on
tools bridging the gap between cross-layer in the direction of
recent work such as MALTON [48]. Also, recall that our study
inherits the limitations of static analysis and malicious native
libraries could also be stored remotely or obfuscated.
Evidence of obfuscation: A large scale investigation of the
use of obfuscation in Google Play have recently shown that
only 24.9% of the apps are obfuscated [47]. In this work
we look at certain evidences of obfuscation among riders.
In particular, we study the usage of crypto libraries, and
three different forms of dynamic code execution: native code,
Dalvik load, and script execution. We show that all forms of
obfuscation are increasingly more popular in malware, with the
usage of cryptography present in 90% of the families in 2017.
When putting this in perspective with respect to legitimate
apps [47], we show sharp increase in the use these techniques.
Discussions about the attribution of certain behaviors such
as the use of obfuscation to repackaged malware have been
recurrent in literature over the last few years [29]. Our findings
strongly suggest that malware developers are ahead of primary
developers.
To the best of our knowledge, there are few malware
detection systems capable of dealing with these forms of
obfuscation. For the case of reflection, authors in [35] pro-
posed HARVESTER, a system that can resolve the targets
of encoded reflective method calls. For the case of incognito
apps, authors in [40] look at inconsistencies left by this
type of obfuscated malware. While these approaches can deal
with certain types of obfuscated malware, they are vulnerable
to motivated adversaries. For instance, HARVESTER can
not deal with static backward slicing attacks. Based on the
evolution observed, we believe that the sophistication used to
obfuscate malware is going to continue to increase.
Dynamic analysis constitutes next line of defense against
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obfuscation [44]. However, we have also observed that evasion
is not only becoming more popular, but also more diverse.
The research community has recently positioned that evasion
attacks can be addressed with static analysis [16]—triggers
can be first identified using symbolic execution and a smart
stimulation strategy can then be devised. One major challenge
here arise from the combination of obfuscation and evasion
attacks. For instance, an adversary can use opaque predicates
to hide the decryption routine of the malware to defeat both
static and dynamic analysis.
Standalone malware: We make no claims about the amount
of standalone malware (i.e., malware that does not take ad-
vantage of repackaging) in the wild but we can report an
estimate as depicted in our dataset. While we found that
25 families (542 samples) out of 1.2K+ families (1,282,022
million samples) could potentially be standalone malware, we
also discarded all families with less than 7 samples per family
from the original set of 3.2K+ families (1,299,109 samples).
This was due to the way differential analysis works, which
requires a critical mass of samples. Given that standalone
malware tends to have a small number of samples per family,
one could assume that most of the samples discarded are
standalone malware. If this holds true, a fair approximation
of the number of standalone malware would then be about 2K
families and 17K samples (62.5% of the families, but only
1.36% of the samples).
On the other hand, our dataset only contains samples that
have been labeled into families by Euphony [21]. Unlabeled
samples are known as Singletons, and there are about 200K of
these in the AndroZoo [4] dataset as of the day we queried it. If
we were to assume that all singletons are standalone malware,
we will then be looking at figures of approximately 13%. It is
worth highlighting this are just over-approximations and some
of those samples are likely be early-stage repackaging.
While we estimate that standalone malware could range be-
tween 1.36% and 13% of the total malware samples in the wild,
authors in [46] report that 35% of the samples in their study
are standalone malware. They analyze roughly 405 samples,
sampled from a larger dataset (cf. Section VII). Interestingly,
some of the families that are flagged as standalone contain
a large number of samples (e.g., LOTOOR and OPFAKE with
1.9K and 1.2K samples respectively), which seems unlikely.
Even if the amount of standalone malware was higher than
our estimate, or our dataset contains standalone families; we
emphasize that differential analysis can still deal with this
threat effectively with no impact to our findings. However,
we argue that having a reliable understanding of how much
standalone malware is in the wild is relevant to the community
and this open question should be further addressed.
VII. RELATED WORK
There have been a number of works analyzing Android
malware over the last years [1], [29]. One of the first and
perhaps the most relevant work putting Android malware in
perspective was presented in 2012 [54]. Together with their
work, authors released a dataset called Android Malgenome.
This dataset was later extended in 2014 by authors in a
project known as Drebin [8]. All samples in Malgenome and
Drebin were first characterized using semi-manual efforts [39],
although in Drebin they later used automated techniques to
systematize the detection of malware. These two datasets haven
been widely explored in the past, however they have been both
discontinued and recent studies have also shown that they are
obsolete [46].
More recently authors in [46] have studied the current land-
scape in the Android ecosystem looking at malware up until
2016. In their study, they manually analyze 405 samples from
an original set of 24,650 apps in 71 families. Interestingly, the
authors report finding 135 variants grouped around those 71
families. In our work, we explore about 1.2 million malicious
samples structured in over 1,200 different malware families
that span until 2017. To avoid manual efforts, we systematize
the analysis of Android malware.
One of the key aspects to consider when systematizing the
analysis of malware is properly curating the dataset to remove
potential noise from samples. Works in the area of malware
network analysis have recently shown that this process is
of paramount importance [24]. In the Android realm, this is
especially challenging due to the proliferation of repackaging
attacks. We tackle this challenge by proposing the use of
differential analysis, which is based on static analysis. Static
analysis has been used in the past to systematize the study
of the Android app ecosystem [14]. More recently, mining
software structures has been successfully applied to the char-
acterization of malware families in Malgenome [42]. However,
up until now this was not used to study malware at large. Our
study is in part possible thanks to (i) the proliferation of online
repositories [4], [23] that are not only storing the most recent
samples, but also intelligence about them (see VirusTotal [45]);
and (ii) recent advances in the systematization of informative
labels obtained from multiple Anti-Virus (AV) vendors [38],
[21]. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first automated
approach that after integrating all these recent efforts together
scales this type of analysis up (avoiding manual analysis).
One important thing to note is that differential analysis can
not only be used to analyze standalone malware, but also
for piggybacked malware used in repackaging attacks. There
have been several works looking at piggybacked malware in
the last few years [53], [52], [12], [11], [3]. In the case
of MassVet [11], authors propose a similar methodology to
find commonalty among apps. However, their focus is on the
detection of repackaging via similarities in the Graphical User
Interface (GUI). In the case of DroidNative [3], authors look
at the CFG of native code to distinguish between goodware
and malware. Instead, we mine common code structures and
measure the prevalence of API-call usage. This allow us to
make a longitudinal measurement of the malware ecosystem
unlike MassVet and DroidNative. Furthermore, our dataset of
malware is about one order of magnitude larger than the one
used in MassVet and about three order of magnitude larger than
in DroidNative. Recently, authors in [27] propose a system to
detect piggybacked apps. They also investigate behaviors seen
in riders, however a key difference with our work is that they
compare pairs of piggyback-original apps individually rather
than providing a per-family overview. The scope of their work
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is limited to 950 pairs of apps seen between 2011 and 2014
as opposed to our work. The main advantage behind a per-
family longitudinal measurement is that findings here provide
a holistic overview of the prevalence and evolution of malice.
This is key to understand how to prioritize threats in real-world
deployments.
Recent works in the area have proposed the use of common
libraries to both locate malicious packages in piggybacked
malware [26] and to create white-lists of Android libraries
used in goodware [25]. In these two approaches, they leverage
on the library name to build a package dependency graph
and measure the similarity between package names. The afore
discussed work [27] also uses package name matching to infer
the ground truth. However, in our work, we choose not to
rely on the package names as these can be easily obfuscated.
Instead, we look at the CFG of different code units (methods).
One major advantage of focusing on the internal structures of
code (rather than on the package and method names) is that it
provides an improved resistance against obfuscation. Note that
program dependency graphs are resilient to layout obfuscation
and forms of code mangling.
Finally, other more recent works have analyzed the evolution
of Android by looking at permission requests [9]. Similar
to the case of package names, the granularity obtained from
permissions is not as precise as API-annotated CFG.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a systematic study of the evo-
lution of rider behaviors in the Android malware ecosystem.
We addressed the challenge of analyzing repackaged malware
by using differential analysis. Our study provides a cross-layer
perspective that inspects the prevalence of sensitive behaviors
in different executables, including native libraries. Our analysis
on over 1.2 million samples that span over a long period of
time showed that malware threats on Android have evolved
rapidly, and evidences the importance of developing anti-
malware systems that are resilient to such changes. This means
that automated approaches relying on machine-learning should
come together with a carefully crafted feature engineering pro-
cess, trained on datasets that are as recent as possible and well
balanced. We have further discussed what our findings mean
for Android malware detection research, highlighting other
areas that need special attention by the research community.
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mkdir /data/data/com.bugtroid/
mkdir /data/data/com.bugtroid/brute
wget hxxp://bugtraq-team.com:6013/[...]/tftpbrute.zip
-O /data/data/com.bugtroid/brute/tftpbrute.zip
cd /data/data/com.bugtroid/tools/
unzip /data/data/com.bugtroid/tools/tftpbrute.zip
chmod 777 /data/data/com.bugtroid/tools/tftpbrute/*
rm /data/data/com.bugtroid/tools/tftpbrute.zip
rm /sdcard/Download/tftpbrute
rm /data/data/com.bugtroid/tftpbrute
if [ -f /data/data/com.bugtroid/[...]/tftpbrute.pl ];
then
touch /sdcard/.tftpbrute
fi
Fig. 8: Excerpt of a bash script recovered from the assets of
a USBCLEAVER sample.
APPENDIX
A. Type of Text Executables
An illustrative example of the type of text executables
embedded within the resources of an app is presented in
Figure 8. In this example, the script fetches a payload called
tftpbrute and attempts to install it as a hidden file in the
solid-state drive of the device. The payload is presumably
an executable used to run a FTP brute force attack. In a
Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) context, this malware could
turn the device into a zombie endpoint capable of probing
private networks that would otherwise be unreachable from
the Internet.
In our study, we parse every text executable that is in com-
mon to the sample of malware families according threshold set
and extract a set of features. We look at some frequent bash
commands and other relevant keywords observed in different
payloads in the wild. Table IV summarizes some of these
features.
B. Features in Native Libraries
Table V shows the prevalence of studied functions across
all three cutoffs. Similar to the case of text executables, the
number of families with common ELFs is small. This is
again expected as these type of resources are also commonly
obfuscated.
C. The case of SIMPLOCKER
Figure 9 show some details about the most relevant methods
seen. For the sake of simplicity, the CFG of the method is
not listed and only annotations are shown (i.e., class and
method name, sensitive API calls invoked within the CFG of
the method, and number of apps sharing this method). While
the class name and the method name might change across
apps in the family, we include a randomly chosen example as
reference.
Method-662:
Seen in: 30 apps (out of 30)
Class Name: Lcom/nisakii/encrypt/msg\
/EncryptFragment$EncProcess$2$1;
Method name: <init>
Behaviors: {ANDROID, CONTENT}
Method-909:
Seen in: 29 apps (out of 30)
Class Name: Lcom/nisakii/encrypt/msg\
/RegistrationActivity;
Method name: onBackPressed
Behaviors: {ANDROID, CONTENT}
Method-1057:
Seen in: 28 apps (out of 30)
Class Name: Lnet/sqlcipher/CursorWindow;
Method name: onAllReferencesReleased
Behaviors: {ANDROID, DATABASE}
Method-1075:
Seen in: 29 apps (out of 30)
Class Name: Landroid/support/v4/content\
/FileProvider;
Method name: delete
Behaviors: {ANDROID, SUPPORT, IO}
Method-1082:
Seen in: 30 apps (out of 30)
Class Name: Lcom/nisakii/encrypt/msg\
/AboutusActivity;
Method name: <init>
Behaviors: {ANDROID, APP}
Fig. 9: Excerpt of common methods for SIMPLOCKER.
D. The case of UTCHI
Figure 10 show details of the most relevant methods seen
while studying the case of UTCHI. Note that names are obfus-
cated to make the reverse engineering process more difficult.
Behaviors observed in most of the common methods
show repeated accesses to private information. For instance,
aq.b() (method-6) queries the content provider to list
all apps installed with PackageManager:getInstalledPackages.
Method y.b() (method-12) extracts the International Mo-
bile Equipment Identity (IMEI) identifier with Telephony-
Manager:getDeviceId and method-13 extracts the International
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number with Telephony-
Manager:getSubscriberId.
Other private information such as details about the data
network are extracted in method-19 using ConnectivityMan-
ager:getActiveNetworkInfo API call. As this library extracts
unique hardware identifiers from the device, user behaviors
can be tracked across multiple malicious apps.
Apart from leaking personal information, this family also
uses reflection to dynamically load new functionality as seen
in method-12.
E. The case of HIDDENAP
Excerpt of common methods from the case study of HIDDE-
NAP. The malware runs an update attack in method-17. Later,
it attempts to drop additional apps and install them with the
support of some native libraries. Before loading the library,
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TABLE IV: Bash commands and keys searched.
• /system/bin/su • /system/bin/am • /system/app • /sdcard • /data/data • install • install • chown • mkdir • grep
• /system/bin/sh • /system/bin/pm • dalvik-cache • getprop • mkpartfs • remount • remount • chmod • mount • root
• Superuser.apk • /system/xbin • /etc/init.d • busybox • setprop • toolbox • tune2fs • fstab • start • rm
TABLE V: Features observed in native libraries.
FEATURE #Fam.
abort 29
accept 9
access 18
atoll 5
bind 12
bsd signal 12
chdir 6
chmod 2
chown 2
close 24
closedir 5
connect 10
crc32 2
delete chain 3
dlopen 11
dlsym 11
dup2 2
epoll create 5
execl 4
execvp 2
exit 26
fclose 18
flock 6
flush entries 3
fopen 19
fork 15
fread 4
free 14
freeaddrinfo 4
fseek 3
fstat 5
ftell 2
ftruncate 4
fwrite 10
getaddrinfo 4
getenv 10
getgrgid 4
getgrnam 4
gethostbyaddr 3
gethostbyname 11
getnameinfo 3
FEATURE #Fam.
getnetbyaddr 3
getnetbyname 3
getopt 2
getopt long 5
getpid 11
getppid 3
getprotobyname 3
getprotobynumber 4
getpwnam 4
getrusage 2
getservbyname 3
getservbyport 3
getsockopt 6
getuid 2
inet addr 3
inotify add watch 7
ioctl 4
iptables globals 3
iptc append entry 4
kernel version 3
kill 7
line 3
listen 10
lrand48 2
lseek 3
malloc 16
memchr 3
memcmp 9
memcpy 32
memmove 4
memset 23
mkdir 4
mkstemp 2
mmap 3
munmap 4
open 15
opendir 5
optarg 6
optind 7
optopt 3
pipe 4
FEATURE #Fam.
poll 3
prctl 7
property get 3
qsort 2
raise 11
read 21
readdir 5
realloc 7
recv 10
recvfrom 2
rename 2
rmdir 2
select 12
send 10
sendto 3
setenv 6
setgid 3
setsid 3
setsockopt 11
setuid 3
shutdown 5
sigaction 3
sleep 18
socket 16
srand48 2
sscanf 7
stat 4
sync 2
sysconf 2
system 11
umask 8
uname 4
unlink 4
unsetenv 2
usleep 3
vfork 4
wait 4
waitpid 7
write 15
xt params 3
xtables chain protos 3
the malware first checks which is the right architecture of the
device with in method-7.
Method-6:
Seen in: 12688 apps (out of 13250)
Class Name: Lnet/nonrnon/qoknlnnnp/aq;
Method name: b
Behaviors: {ANDROID, CONTENT}
Method-12:
Seen in: 12669 apps (out of 13250)
Class Name: Lnet/nonrnon/qoknlnnnp/y;
Method name: b
Behaviors: {REFLECTION, TELEPHONY,
ANDROID, PROVIDER,
CONTENT, IO}
Method-13:
Seen in: 12954 apps (out of 13250)
Class Name: Lnet/nonrnon/qoknlnnnp/y;
Method name: a
Behaviors: {ANDROID, TELEPHONY, CONTENT}
Method-19:
Seen in: 13107 apps (out of 13250)
Class Name: Lnet/nonrnon/qoknlnnnp/bm;
Method name: b
Behaviors: {ANDROID, CONTENT, NETWORK}
Fig. 10: Excerpt of common methods for UTCHI.
Method-7:
Seen in: 83 apps (out of 83)
Class Name: Lcom/secneo/guard/Util;
Method name: checkX86
Behaviors: {ANDROID, CONTENT, IO}
Method-15:
Seen in: 83 apps (out of 70)
Class Name: Lcom/secneo/guard/Util;
Method name: CopyArmLib
Behaviors: {ANDROID, CONTENT}
Method-17:
Seen in: 83 apps (out of 70)
Class Name: Lcom/secneo/guard/Util;
Method name: checkUpdate
Behaviors: {ANDROID, CONTENT, IO}
Fig. 11: Excerpt of common methods for HIDDENAP.
